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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper evaluates gender wage differentials in Georgia between 2000 and 2004. Using 
ordinary least squares, we find that the gender wage gap in Georgia is substantially 
higher than in other transition countries. Correcting for sample selection bias using the 
Heckman approach further increases the gender wage gap. The Blinder Oaxaca 
decomposition results suggest that most of the wage gap remains unexplained. The 
explained portion of the gap is almost entirely attributed to industrial variables. We find 
that the gender wage gap in Georgia diminished between 2000 and 2004. 
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The breakdown of the Soviet Union has led to a dramatic economic and social 
transformation of the Socialist-bloc countries. Increased income inequality has been an 
unwelcome feature of this transformation in many of these countries. A growing body of 
literature focuses on the gender dimension of income inequality in this region, where 
gender equality was lauded as one of the greatest achievements of its former economic 
system. 
This paper contributes to the literature by evaluating the case of Georgia. The 
paper focuses on a particular aspect of gender inequality, namely the gender wage gap. 
The objective of the paper is to evaluate gender wage differentials in Georgia during 
2000–2004 and to explain their sources. We assess this issue by estimating a Mincerian 
wage earnings equation with education, experience, and other relevant characteristics as 
dependent variables and evaluate whether, controlling for these factors, women are 
remunerated differently from men. We adjust the results for sample selection bias and 





Evidence from the Soviet period indicates that the gender wage gap in the Soviet Union 
was comparable to Western countries (Ofer and Vinokur 1992). The breakdown of the 
Soviet Union eliminated institutional mechanisms aimed at maintaining gender wage 
equality and in many countries resulted in the widening of the gap. Although systematic 
assessment of the situation in Georgia is lacking, available evidence indicates that this is 
in fact what happened in early 1990s (Yemtsov 2001). 
Zooming forward to the most recent past, the Georgian government has taken 
specific steps aimed at advancing the cause of gender equality. Among most recent 
changes, in 2004, the Gender Equality Advisory Council was established under the 
Parliament Speaker’s office. In 2005, the Government Commission on Gender Equality 
(GCGE) was created with a one-year mandate of drafting the National Action Plan for 
strengthening gender equality. The goal of the Action Plan was to “facilitate the 
development and adoption of relevant monitoring mechanisms to plan and review   3
implementation of government obligations to gender equality” (Jashi 2005). In February 
2006, the commission and the council set up a joint working group, which produced the 
Gender Equality Strategy of Georgia (Sabedashvili 2007: 25). This document was 
presented as “The State Concept on Gender Equality” before the Parliament of Georgia 
and approved by it in July 2006. However, it has not yet translated into any plan of action 
for internalizing the gender framework into political, social, and economic decision-
making. As a member of the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women pointed out during the meeting with the Georgian representatives, “in practice, 
many of women’s rights [in Georgia are] violated, for example in the field of 
employment. It [is] not enough to introduce legislation for gender equality—it [is] also 
important to ensure equality in practice” (CEDAW 2006).  
It appears that in the Georgian society gender equality as a societal goal is 
perceived as a concept imposed from outside and potentially threatening the traditional 
way of life. Sabedashvili (2007: 24–25) points out that in practice gender equality efforts 
in Georgia are supported almost exclusively by international donor organizations, which 
contributes to this perception. It is noteworthy that, according to one survey, 45.4% of the 
respondents indicate that in their view men and women in Georgia are, in fact, equal 
(Sumbadze 2008).
1 
  Yet, the evidence on political representation points to the contrary. As of 2006, 
there were no female city mayors in Georgia (Sumbadze 2008). In 2008, only 7 out of 
139 members of Parliament were women (5%) (Department of Statitics 2008). As of 
January 2009, there were no women in the ministerial level positions of the Georgian 
government.  
The focus of this study is on assessing the economic dimension of gender 
inequality in Georgia, covering the late transition period from 2000 until 2004, when 
institutional shifts described above started taking place. Therefore, this study aims at 
establishing a baseline for the future analysis of the impact of gender targeted policies. 
Previous work empirically evaluating the gender wage gap in Georgia is very 
limited. Jashi (2005) provides an excellent descriptive assessment of the gender issues 
currently facing Georgia. Her survey summarizes recent demographic and socioeconomic 
                                                 
1 The survey was conducted in 2007 by the Institute of Policy Studies.   4
trends observed among men and women. Yemtsov (2001) evaluates the connection 
between the labor market conditions and poverty in Georgia using 1992–1995 household 
survey data. He briefly mentions the presence of substantial differences in pay between 
men and women in Georgia during 1992–1995. However, he does not explicitly quantify 
these differences; nor does he attempt to explain their presence. 
At the same time, the gender wage gap literature on transition countries is 
expanding and can be used to place Georgia in the context of other countries in the 
region. A number of studies analyze the Russian case. Among them are Brainerd (1998), 
Newell and Reilly (1996), Reilly (1999), Arabsheibani and Lau (1999), Glinskaya and 
Mroz (2000), Gerry et al. (2004), Cheidvasser and Benitez Silva (2007), Kazakova 
(2007), and Johnes and Tanaka (2008). According to these studies, in Russia the 
female/male wage ratio varies from 0.60 (reported for 1994 in Brainerd [1998]) to 0.78 
(reported for 1995 in Glinskaya and Mroz [2000]). Brainerd (2000) analyzes a number of 
Central and Eastern European countries, among which are three former Soviet Union 
countries: Russia, Ukraine, and Estonia. She finds that in 1994, in Russia, women earned 
68% of what men did. These numbers in Ukraine and Estonia were 60% and 74%, 
respectively. Anderson and Pomfret (2003) analyze the Kyrgyz data and find that the 
female-male wage ratio was 66% in 1993 and it increased to 83% in 1997. However, 
more recent evidence points to the worsening of the situation. According to the Asian 
Development Bank’s Gender Assessment Report (ADB 2005), as of 2000, Kyrgyz 
women earned 67.6% of what men did and by 2002 the ratio declined further to 64.9%. 
Most studies find that individual characteristics explain a very small portion of the gender 
wage differentials. In fact, Anderson and Pomfret (2003) conclude that in Kyrgyzstan in 
1993 and 1997, controlling for individual characteristics, women’s wages should have 




The 2000–2004 dataset in this study comes from the Georgian Household Budget Survey 
(HBS) run by the Georgian Department of Statistics. It is based on a quarterly survey of 
3,351 households.   5
This analysis is focused on investigating gender wage differentials among 
individuals who work for pay.
2 The sample in the analysis is restricted to the men 
between 16–64 years old and women 16–59 years old. Employed individuals earning 
zero income are excluded from the sample.
3 
  Wages are defined in terms of monthly wage income from main employment, 
expressed in Georgian laris. For comparison purposes, we normalize all wage data in 
terms of year 2000 using official CPI data (Georgian Statistical Yearbook 2006). The 
education variable is years of education imputed from the data. Following the literature, 
experience is constructed as age minus schooling minus 6. Regional and industrial 
variables are dummy variables, which take the value of 1 when the respondent lives in the 
corresponding region or works in a corresponding industry. Tbilisi is the reference 
region. Agriculture is the reference sector. The urban variable takes the value of 1 for 
urban regions and 0 otherwise. 
Based on the dataset, Georgian women are more educated than Georgian men. 
Their mean years of education are 11.9 as opposed to 11.85 for men, although the 
difference is not statistically significant.  
In interpreting the labor force data from the household survey, the peculiarities of 
the household questionnaire need to be taken into consideration. The reported 
employment categories are nonworking age, hired employed, self-employed, or not-
employed (individuals who have no job, regardless of whether they are searching for one 
or not
4). The nonworking age category includes individuals younger than 16 years of age. 
The not-employed category lumps together nonworking individuals looking for a job 
(officially unemployed individuals) and those who, for a number of reasons (e.g., 
retirement or taking care of children), are not looking for a job. As a result, both the labor 
force participation rate and the unemployment rate calculated from the household survey 
are likely to be overestimated. Moreover, assuming that a greater proportion of women 
than men in Georgia are out of the labor force, the participation rate of women is likely to 
                                                 
2 A number of studies focus on assessing gender wage inequality among self-employed (Hundley 2000; 
Eastough and Miller 2004).  
3 The employed zero-earning group constitutes 1.8% of the sample. 
4 As opposed to unemployed defined to be individuals without work, available for work, and looking for 
work, see http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/c3e.html.   6
be overestimated more than it is for men. The same can be said about the unemployment 
rate. 
In addition, in the case of the labor force participation rate, the different 
retirement ages of women and men influence the estimates. Recall that women between 
the age of 16 and 59 are included in the sample, whereas for men the age range is 
between 16 and 64. 
With these points made, we find that during 2000–2004 the labor force 
participation rate for men was, on average, 7 percentage points higher than it was for 
women. We observe a positive time trend in female labor force participation during 
2000–2004, whereas for men there is no clear pattern. In addition, the female 
unemployment rate was significantly higher than male unemployment rate. 
  
Table 1. Labor Force Data in the Sample 




  Female Male Female  Male 
2000  0.5783 0.6457 0.4583  0.3502
2001  0.5755 0.6391 0.4444  0.3341
2002  0.5875 0.6671 0.5325  0.4085
2003  0.5936 0.6503 0.5131  0.3786
2004  0.5918 0.6428 0.4575  0.3433
 
 
The female labor force is concentrated in three sectors: education, health care and 
social services, and culture (see figure 1). Almost 57% of the female paid workforce was 
engaged in these three sectors during 2000–2004. This result is similar to the findings 
from other countries (ADB 2005). Men are more evenly represented in different sectors 
of the Georgia economy. The three main employers for men were manufacturing, 
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The share of women in the three dominant sectors decreased from 60.91% in 2000 
to 55.31% in 2004, still a high number (see appendix table 2). It is noteworthy that most 
of the changes in the composition of the female paid labor occurred within the service 
sector, with the outflow of labor force from health, trade, and finance into the hotel 
industry, public administration, and education. The movement into public administration 
and education markedly coincides with the dramatic reorganization within these spheres 
that has taken place since 2003. At the same time, industries, such as manufacturing, 
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Figure 2. Changes in the Industrial Composition of Female Wage Employment 


























For men, the picture is somewhat different in that we observe shifts across types 
of industries. Similar to women, there is movement into education and public 
administration. The share of manufacturing declines whereas the share of agriculture in 
paid employment increased, possibly pointing to changes in the structure of the 


















                                                 
5 This observation is particularly interesting as we observe a drop in the share of self-employed farmers. 
These shifts might indicate an increase in the size of agricultural enterprises. 
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High occupational concentration observed among Georgian women is not 
uncommon. Some degree of occupational segregation is observed in most countries 
(Dolado, Felgueroso, and Jimeno 2002). However, because “female” occupations tend to 
pay less, women, on average, receive lower earnings than men based on the occupational 
characteristics. In fact, agriculture together with education, health care, and culture—the 
industries with the highest concentration of women—are the lowest paying industries in 
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Table 2. Mean Earnings by Industry, Georgian laris (2000–2004 average) 
 
Industry Wage 
Agriculture 3.10   
Mining 85.75   
Manufacturing 102.75   
Power 92.82   
Construction 144.32   
Trade 115.72   
Hotels 119.29   
Transport 139.44   
Finance 115.22   
Real Estate  86.66  
Public 
Administration 70.61   
Education 45.27   
Health 39.35   
Culture 71.17   
Hired Household 
Labor 87.29   
International 
Organizations 360.10   
 
 
On average, women earn about 57% of what men do and this pattern is present in 
each year in the sample. If anything, the situation appears to have worsened during 2000–
2004 (see table 3).  
 
Table 3. Average Wages among Wage Workers, in Year 2000 Georgian laris 
 
  Female Male  Female/Male 
Ratio 
2000  57.70 98.09  0.59 
2001  63.88 105.86  0.60 
2002  69.25 125.50  0.55 
2003  75.15 135.70  0.55 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
There are large variations in the approaches and variables used for estimating the gender 
wage gap (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2005). The choice of approach affects the 
size of the estimated gender wage gap, as well as the estimates of the gender wage 
discrimination. So does the choice of variables and the inclusion of different groups of 
individuals. 
To enable the comparison of the Georgian case to the studies of other countries, 
we use an augmented version of the conventional Mincerian earnings equation (Mincer 
1974): 
  
lnwj = α+Xjβ +εj,             (1) 
 
where subscript j denotes individual j, variable wj stands for monthly wages of individual 
j, Xj is a vector of explanatory variables for individual j, which includes schooling, 
experience, experience squared, gender, and geographic and industry-level 
characteristics.
6 
The Mincerian earnings equation is first estimated using an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) approach. The potential presence of a correlation between the matrix of regressors 
and the error term has been shown to lead to inconsistent (and biased, in the small sample 
case) coefficient estimates (Card 1999 and 2001). In the case of the Mincerian earnings 
equation, there are several potential sources of correlation between the regressors and the 
error term. Khitarishvili (2008) uses the instrumental variables approach to test for the 
presence of endogeneity in the education variable and does not find sufficient evidence to 
reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of education. 
In this study we test and correct for another potential source of correlation: 
sample selection bias. If the selection of individuals into the category of wage earners is 
not random, the coefficient estimates in the wage equation can be biased. We use the 
Heckman sample-selection correction method (Heckman 1979) to test and correct for the 
                                                 
6 The use of industrial dummies in the wage equation in the context of gender wage decomposition has 
been discussed in Blau and Ferber (1987). They suggest that including industrial dummies provides a lower 
bound on the discrimination whereas excluding them provides an upper bound.    12
presence of sample selection bias. The wage equation remains equation (1). The selection 
equation is: 
 
gj = δ+Zjγ +uj,             (2) 
 
where gj takes the value of 1 if the individual is a paid worker and earning positive 
income and 0 otherwise; Zj includes all variables in Xi except industrial variables (which 
do not apply to unemployed individuals), plus dummy variables for marriage and the 
number of children under 6. 
The presence of sample selection bias can be evidenced by the significance of the 
inverse Mills ratio λ, whose coefficient is ρ times σ. In turn, ρ is the correlation 
coefficient between ε and u, and σ is the standard deviation of ε. 
We test for sample selection bias and find the evidence of its presence for men. 
We correct for sample selection bias for men and perform a Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition of the male-female wage differential to identify the causes of the wage 
gap. The objective of the decomposition is to identify how much of the difference in 
mean wages between men and women can be explained by the predictors. Following the 
notation of Jann (2008), the objective is to explain R = E(Ym)-E(Yw), where Ym is the 
mean log wages of men and Yw is the mean log wages of women. 
Based on equation (1), R can be expressed as: 
 
R = E(Ym) – E(Yw) = E(Xm)’βm – E(Xw)’βw,    (3) 
 
given the assumptions that E(εw)=0 and E(εm)=0. 
We avoid the issue of the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the reference 
group by considering the average of the estimated coefficients for men and women as the 
nondiscriminatory estimate (Jann 2008). That is, 
 
R = [E(Xm)– E(Xw)]’[Wbw + (I – W) bm] + [(I – W)’ E(Xm)+W’ E(Xw)]’ (bm - bw), 
 
   13
where W = 0.5I. The first component of R is explained by the predictor differences 
between men and women and the second component is the unexplained part.  
A substantial unexplained component is commonly attributed to gender 




Mincerian Earnings Functions 
We start by analyzing the pooled results for men and women from 2000–2004. At each 
estimation step (the OLS, Heckman, and Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition), sample weights 
are used to adjust the results. 
  The OLS results indicate that the returns to education in Georgia are quite low 
compared to other countries in the region. The returns to education of 0.0447 for women 
are slightly higher than the estimate of 0.0427 for men, a common finding in the literature 
(Shultz 1993; Dougherty 2003), although the estimates are not statistically different from 
each other. 
Experience is insignificant for both men and women. This result, too, is consistent 
with the literature, although it is unclear whether it is due to its true lack of importance or 
to the possible attenuation bias attributable to the measurement error. In addition, this 
measure is likely to underestimate the true importance of experience for women because 
women are more likely to become and stay unemployed (Lauerova and Terrell 2002; 
Guarcello et al. 2005). 
In provincial regions, men and women tend to fair similarly in terms of their 
earnings. Samcxe, located in the southwest of Georgia is the poorest, whereas Ajara fairs 
the best relative to Tbilisi. Men in urban areas are remunerated almost three times more 
than women. 
For both males and females, most industries are characterized by positive wage 
premia relative to agriculture (the reference industry), with the notable exceptions of 
health, education, and culture. Of course, as already discussed, these also happen to be 
the female-dominated industries.   14
Looking at trends over time for both men and women, returns to education 
increase between 2000 and 2004, whereas the importance of experience remains marginal 
for both 2000 and 2004. 
For men, it appears that regional disparities had increased by 2004, although 
urban regions no longer seemed to have as much advantage as in 2000. For, women 
regional disparities either shrank or didn’t increase dramatically, a curious result 
especially in comparison with male results. The urban variable is insignificant for both 
time periods. 
With some exceptions (notably finance), wage premia for men increased between 
2000 and 2004 (not always significantly). Changes in male-dominated mining, 
manufacturing, power, and construction industries were most significant. For women, 
wage premia increase in all industries, notably in finance and international organizations. 
This might indicate that women are taking advantage of these relatively new and 
expanding high-skilled sectors. Yet, these results have to be interpreted with some 
caution. Although wage premia for women increased, we observed a simultaneous 
outflow of female labor from the financial sector. Moreover, we have to be mindful of the 
fact that for women mean wages in agriculture (relative to which the premia are assessed) 
decreased from 60.84 laris to 46.10 laris, whereas for men they increased from 83.62 laris 
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Table 4. OLS Results for Men and Women 
 MEN  WOMEN 
 pooled  2000  2004  pooled  2000  2004 
  coefficients†  std. 
errors  coefficients  std. 
errors  coefficients  std. 
errors  coefficients  std. 
errors  coefficients  std. 
errors  coefficients  std. 
errors 
Education   0.0427*  0.0063
1   0.0394**  0.0159   0.0519*  0.0134   0.0447*  0.0066   0.0329**  0.0159   0.0790*  0.0137 
Experience   0.0022  0.0051  -0.0064  0.0108   0.0164*** 0.0099    0.0092  0.0063   0.0109  0.0144   0.0091  0.0130 
Experience
2  -0.0001 0.0001    0.0000  0.0002  -0.0004** 0.0002  -0.0002***  0.0001 -0.0002  0.0003  -0.0001  0.0003 
Urban   0.1619*  0.0387   0.2295**  0.0961 -0.0201  0.0858    0.0552  0.0360   0.0442  0.0889  -0.1108  0.0682 
Kaxeti  -0.4593  0.0662  -0.2906***  0.1493  -0.6214*  0.1346  -0.5247*  0.0622  -0.4876*  0.1895  -0.4411*  0.1067 
Kvemo Kartli  -0.0359  0.0547  -0.0490  0.1361  -0.3855*  0.1037  -0.0477  0.0513   0.0717  0.1262  -0.2025**  0.0980 
Samcxe  -0.6751  0.0776  -0.8710*  0.1949  -0.5697*  0.1468  -0.5672*  0.0736  -1.0829*  0.1536  -0.2888**  0.1267 
Ajara   0.0099  0.0561   0.1766  0.1255  -0.3587*  0.1128  -0.0631  0.0571   0.3121*  0.1171  -0.2223***  0.1272 
Guria  -0.5396  0.0719  -0.4332*  0.1458  -1.1174*  0.1385  -0.5491*  0.0690  -0.6341*  0.1549  -0.3902*  0.1485 
Samegrelo  -0.4618  0.0650  -0.3076**  0.1468  -0.9092*  0.1385  -0.5503*  0.0565  -0.5148*  0.1488  -0.6190*  0.1100 
Imereti  -0.4710  0.0546  -0.5266*  0.1328  -0.5426*  0.1066  -0.4368*  0.0518  -0.4163*  0.1218  -0.2952*  0.1078 
Shida Kartli  -0.3756  0.0585  -0.3110**  0.1419  -0.6322*  0.1433  -0.4064*  0.0516  -0.4289*  0.1292  -0.4277*  0.1008 
Mining    0.2885  0.2032  -0.0193  0.5146   1.2162* 0.2541  -0.3802 0.7661  -    -   
Manufacturing    0.3893  0.0803   0.3617***  0.1957   0.3936**  0.1819   0.4005*  0.1212   0.4330**  0.2134   1.0195*  0.3077 
Power    0.3589  0.0942   0.3042  0.2214   0.4922* 0.1890    0.3666**  0.1664   0.1244  0.3292   1.0244*  0.3595 
Construction    0.5822  0.0918   0.4415***  0.2385   0.6970*  0.1940   0.0978  0.2893   0.7378* 0.2286    1.8942* 0.4160 
Trade    0.4814  0.0832   0.6842*  0.2086   0.5040* 0.1806    0.3697*  0.1187    0.4153*** 0.2180  0.9239*  0.2965 
Hotels    0.6301  0.1296   0.6333**  0.3200   0.8239* 0.2292    0.6477* 0.1420    0.2006  0.4826   1.1358*  0.3062 
Transport    0.5105  0.0848   0.5619*  0.1950   0.5912* 0.1920    0.3378*  0.1252    0.3882*** 0.2249  0.8022*  0.3069 
Finance    0.3590  0.1715   0.6388**  0.2792   0.5124  0.5354   0.4346*  0.1626   0.2127  0.2923   1.3267*  0.3542 
Real estate   0.1899  0.1180   0.1297  0.3096   0.1410  0.1825  -0.0305  0.1470   0.4725 0.3352    0.5376  0.3481 
Public admin   0.0052  0.0785   0.0237  0.1960   0.1474  0.1757 -0.1127  0.1189  -0.1345  0.2528   0.4344  0.3002 
Education  -0.3256 0.0973  -0.5887** 0.2603  -0.1165  0.1949 -0.2784** 0.1127  -0.2768  0.2005   0.2449  0.2920 
Health  -0.3360 0.1586  -0.1581  0.2707    0.1613 0.2482  -0.3532*  0.1162  -0.1682 0.2077    0.1998  0.2999 
Culture   -0.0446 0.1007    0.0172  0.2374    0.1066 0.2122  -0.1297  0.1274    0.0945 0.2343    0.5297***  0.3206 
Hired HH  -0.3330 0.0883  -0.2977  0.2001  -     0.7504*  0.1724   1.0663* 0.2911    0.9058*  0.3041 
International    1.1729  0.3305  -     1.2919*  0.4206*   0.8208 0.6973    0.4831**  0.2385   1.0142*** 0.5494 
D01   0.1655  0.0506           0.0964***  0.0527         
D02   0.3300  0.0522           0.2823*  0.0500        
D03   0.3454  0.0501           0.2983*  0.0491        
D04   0.6031  0.0478           0.5349*  0.0498        
Constant    3.4122  0.1211   3.4724*  0.3314   3.9042* 0.2486    3.0895*  0.1603    3.1323* 0.3509    2.6320* 0.3651 
N  3109    601   679     2685    508       
R
2   0.2701    .2615    0.2973     0.3095     0.2605       
                      
†standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity 
 
Heckman Model: Interpreting the First-Stage Regression Results 
Irrespective of the presence or absence of sample selection bias, the first-stage probit 
results are informative in understanding the characteristics of individuals engaged in 
wage employment.
7 
We find that marriage, a key variable in determining the probability of a person 
being wage employed, plays opposing roles for men and for women. Being married raises 
the probability that a man is employed by 0.2630. For women, the effect is the opposite 
and very sizable: marriage reduces the probability of a woman being wage employed by 
0.3799. 
Not surprisingly, having children under six has strong and negative bearing on 
women’s probability of being engaged in wage employment, reducing it by 0.1605. It has 
                                                 
7 The results are robust to different specifications (e.g., the number of children under sixteen, in addition to 
the number of children under six).   16
little effect on the probability of men working for a wage (if anything, it is positive, albeit 
insignificant). 
 
        Table 5. Heckman Correction First-Stage Regression Results 
 Males  Females 
  Coefficients  Std. Errors  Coefficients  Std. Errors 
Marriage    0.2630*  0.0373  -0.3799*  0.0361 
Number of Children  0.0002  0.0230  -0.1605*  0.0326 
Education   0.1149*  0.0062   0.1819*  0.0069 
Experience   0.0513*  0.0045   0.0857*  0.0054 
Experience
2    -0.0009*  0.0001  -0.0014*  0.0001 
Urban   0.3470*  0.0329   0.3818*  0.0346 
Kaxeti  -0.1818*  0.0569  0.0360  0.0610 
Kvemo Kartli  -0.2657*  0.0549        -0.0309  0.0590 
Samcxe    -0.2830*  0.0651    0.2291*  0.0664 
Ajara   -0.1140**  0.0530  0.0741  0.0576 
Guria    -0.2642*  0.0662  0.0097  0.0697 
Samegrelo  -0.4623*  0.0585        -0.0755  0.0595 
Imereti  -0.1761*  0.0506     0.1136**  0.0521 
Shida Kartli  -0.1862*  0.0534    0.1622*  0.0560 
D19     -0.0394  0.0454        -0.0357  0.0496 
D23   -0.0929**  0.0461        -0.0647  0.0488 
D27    -0.0755***  0.0439        -0.0608  0.0469 
D32    -0.1336*  0.0433        -0.0350  0.0456 




Education is another key variable in explaining the probability of both men and 
women being employed for a wage. It plays a more important role for women than for 
men. For men, the probability of being employed increases by 0.1149, whereas for 
women it rises by 0.1819. This might indicate that more educated women are more likely 
to seek employment opportunities. Alternatively, it might mean that employers are 
paying more attention to women’s education than to men’s when making hiring 
decisions, pointing to some differences in the way in which women and men are treated. 
Regional variables paint an interesting picture of the labor market situation for 
men and women. Men living in provincial regions are much less likely to work for pay 
than women are. This result could be interpreted in a number of ways. It could be that 
women in rural areas are more likely to find wage employment than men are. 
Alternatively, rural men are more likely to own land, which automatically qualifies them 
to be considered self-employed farmers, possibly explaining this result. 
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Heckman Model: Evidence of Sample Selection Bias 
The selection equation in the Heckman model includes marriage and the number of 
children under six years old as identifying variables. We do not use industrial variables, 
as they do not apply to the unemployed. 
The coefficient on λ is significant for men, indicating the presence of sample 
selection bias, whereas for women it is insignificant. This result is important as it 
indicates the presence of different mechanisms describing the selection into wage work 
for men and women. A number of studies conducted on transition countries find no 
evidence of sample selection bias (Gerry et al. 2004), while others conduct sample 
selection bias correction only for women, implicitly assuming that sample selection bias 
is an issue only for the female population (Arabsheibani and Lau 1999; Arabsheibani and 
Mussurov 2007). The results in this study point to a need to pay more attention to the 
causes of sample selection bias among men as well as women. 
A key finding, which has received little to no attention in the literature, is the sign 
of the λ coefficient, σρ, which is negative for both men and women. Given that σ is 
positive, the key factor determining the sign of the coefficient is ρ. The significance of 
the coefficient of λ points to the mere presence of sample selection bias, however its sign 
has direct bearing on the results of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition as, under negative 
ρ, mean wages are underestimated. Thus, finding a negative and significant coefficient 
for men implies the need for correction only for men, which results in an increase in 
men’s mean wages without a corresponding increase in the mean wages for women. 
Thus, the gender wage gap with correction for sample selection bias will be higher than 
without it (a result corroborated by findings in the literature although, again, not 
sufficiently analyzed). 
The negative ρ indicates that characteristics that raise an individual’s salary in 
fact reduce this person’s probability of being employed. Given that the coefficient on λ is 
significant and its value is higher for men than it is for women, we can infer that for men, 
much more so than for women, factors that lead to their earning higher wages are also 
factors responsible for their not being hired.  
There has been a rise in the number of studies that obtain negative estimates of 
ρ (see Dolton and Makepeace [1986] for an early work). Given the counterintuitive   18
nature of this result, the vast majority of studies either does not address this issue or 
attribute it to a misspecification of the model. In fact, for former Soviet republics, all 
studies, which use the Heckman correction in the context of gender wage gap, obtain 
negative estimates of ρ, with none attempting to elaborate on its implications (e.g., 
Arabsheibani and Lau 1999; Cheidvasser and Benitez Silva 2007; Gerry et al. 2004). 
Given the mounting evidence, it seems appropriate to pay more attention to this finding, 
especially because it sheds light on the mechanisms shaping the selection process into 
wage employment. 
The conventional literature on sample selection bias revolves around the 
reservation wage hypothesis, according to which the unemployed status is supply-driven 
(Heckman 1979). According to this hypothesis, individuals evaluate wage offers by 
comparing them to their reservation wages. If the wage offer is below their reservation 
wage, individuals refuse the offer and, as a result, the offer is unobserved. If the wage 
offer is above their reservation wage, individuals accept it and, thus, this wage offer is 
observed. In such a context, obtaining a negative correlation between the error terms of 
the wage equation and selection equation is counterintuitive, as it appears to mean that 
individuals are more likely to accept lower rather than higher wage offers. Yet, Ermisch 
and Wright (1994) find that negative ρ, in fact, can be consistent with the reservation 
wage hypothesis. They show that ρ will be negative if the variance of wage offers is 
smaller than the covariance of wage offers and reservation wages. For exposition 
purposes, if we assume that the means of wage offers and reservation wages are the same, 
an implication of this finding is that for individuals whose wage offer deviation from the 
mean is positive, the reservation wage deviation from the mean should be even higher. 
When that happens, of course, the wage offer will not be accepted. Thus, individuals with 
higher wage offers also happen to be the ones more likely to be out of the sample with 
observed wages because they are the ones rejecting the offers.  
Nicaise (2001) proposes an alternative explanation according to which 
unemployment often has an involuntary character, especially in the context of developing 
and transition countries. That is, market wages are above individuals’ reservation wages, 
but these individuals are not hired by employers. Nicaise (2001) proposes an alternative 
“crowding” hypothesis, according to which, holding all individual characteristics   19
constant, employers offer jobs to individuals who are willing to work for lower pay (that 
is, those who have lower reservation wages). Thus, individuals who are more likely to 
work are also individuals who are paid less (by employers) than otherwise 
observationally identical individuals from a population. Thus, in this case, individuals 
with higher wage offers are less likely to be in the labor force not because they also have 
higher reservation wages and therefore reject these offers, but because individuals with 
higher reservation wages are rejected by employers in favor of individuals with lower 
reservation wages (assuming that such exist).  
 
Heckman Model: Interpreting the Changes in Means and Slopes 
According to both interpretations (Ermisch and Wright 1994; Nicaise 2001), in the 
presence of negative ρ, the uncorrected wage distribution underestimates the true wage 
distribution. That is, once we correct for sample selection bias, the mean wages should 
increase. That is in fact the case in this estimation. Once the Heckman correction is 
implemented, men’s mean wages rise from 78.8 laris to 172.4 laris.  
The shifts in the slope of the coefficients shed further light on which of the 
alternative hypotheses dominates. To illustrate this point, we will focus on the 
interpretation of the education coefficient. In particular, if Ermisch and Wright’s 
intepretation is dominant, it would be sensible to suppose that more educated individuals 
are also more likely to have higher variation in reservation wages (e.g., more of them 
require higher reservation wages). Therefore, the most educated are more likely to be 
underrepresented in the sample compared to the less educated individuals. If so, then 
correcting for sample selection bias should increase the slope of the education coefficient. 
In fact, Harmon and Walker (1995) suggest that to be the case, implicitly assuming this 
interpretation. 
On the other hand, if Nicaise’s interpretation is dominant, it might make more 
sense to suppose that less educated individuals have less leverage to bargain for higher 
wages compared to more qualified, educated individuals. As a result, less educated 
individuals demanding higher wages might be underrepresented in the sample, as their 
demands are not met by the employers; thus, correcting for sample selection bias would 
lower the slope of the education coefficient.    20
Our results indicate that the slope of the education coefficient in fact decreases for 
both men and women, which pushes us to conclude that the “crowding” interpretation is 
dominant. Moreover, a cursory look at the data indicates that labor force participation 
rates increase with education, a result common in the literature (Cheidvasser and Benitez-
Silva 2007), contradicting the needed condition under the reservation hypothesis. This 
conclusion is consistent with the results observed in many transition countries, in which, 
given the lack of economic opportunities, the leverage lies in the hands of the 
employers—workers, especially less educated ones, do not have a lot of say in setting 
their salaries. 
 
Heckman Model: Interpreting the Presence of Sample Selection Bias among Men 
and its Lack among Women 
We now return to the evidence of sample selection bias among men, with negative and 
significant coefficient on λ, and the absence of sample selection bias among women. This 
finding seems to suggest that men are more likely to accept jobs with wages in the lower 
segment of their wage offer distribution. This can be explained by the fact that finding a 
job is men’s primary responsibility. Women, too, experience a downward pressure on 
their wages; however, due to their primary role as caretakers, they are less likely to 
accept jobs in the low segment of female wage offer distribution. As a result, the 
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Table 6. Estimates of the Extended Mincerian Regression for 2000–2004 (dependent  
variable ln [Wages]) 
 OLS  Heckman 
  Males Females  Males Females 
  coefficients  Std. Errors  coefficients  Std. Errors  coefficients  Std errors  coefficients  Std. errors 
Education   0.0427*  0.0063
†   0.0447*  0.0066  -0.0167  0.0103   0.0355***  0.0192 
Experience   0.0022  0.0051   0.0092  0.0063  -0.0311* 0.0074    0.0055  0.0096 
Experience
2  -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0002*** 0.0001   0.0004*  0.0001 -0.0002  0.0002 
Urban   0.1619*  0.0387   0.0552  0.0360  -0.0281 0.0490    0.0345  0.0528 
Kaxeti  -0.4593  0.0662  -0.5247*  0.0622  -0.3696*  0.0744  -0.5273*  0.0622 
Kvemo Kartli  -0.0359  0.0547  -0.0477  0.0513   0.0883  0.0656  -0.0487  0.0515 
Samcxe  -0.6751  0.0776  -0.5672*  0.0736  -0.5341*  0.0878  -0.5700*  0.0752 
Ajara   0.0099  0.0561  -0.0631  0.0571   0.0610  0.0633  -0.0683  0.0573 
Guria  -0.5396  0.0719  -0.5491*  0.0690  -0.4042*  0.0828  -0.5487*  0.0693 
Samegrelo  -0.4618  0.0650  -0.5503*  0.0565  -0.2187*  0.0811  -0.5474*  0.0575 
Imereti  -0.4710  0.0546  -0.4368*  0.0518  -0.3768*  0.0628  -0.4433*  0.0520 
Shida Kartli  -0.3756  0.0585  -0.4064*  0.0516  -0.2773*  0.0666  -0.4156*  0.0533 
Mining    0.2885  0.2032  -0.3802  0.7661   0.2613  0.2039  -0.3816  0.7713 
Manufacturing    0.3893  0.0803   0.4005*  0.1212   0.3493* 0.0774    0.4068*  0.1220 
Power    0.3589  0.0942   0.3666**  0.1664   0.3208* 0.0909    0.3609**  0.1668 
Construction    0.5822  0.0918   0.0978  0.2893   0.5514* 0.0890    0.0892  0.2904 
Trade    0.4814  0.0832   0.3697*  0.1187   0.4320* 0.0807    0.3643*  0.1196 
Hotels    0.6301  0.1296   0.6477*  0.1420   0.5730* 0.1250    0.6387*  0.1435 
Transport    0.5105  0.0848   0.3378*  0.1252   0.4801* 0.0816    0.3317*  0.1260 
Finance    0.3590  0.1715   0.4346*  0.1626   0.3203** 0.1636    0.4274*  0.1631 
Real estate   0.1899  0.1180  -0.0305  0.1470   0.1830  0.1133  -0.0362  0.1474 
Public admin    0.0052  0.0785 -0.1127  0.1189 -0.0366 0.0764  -0.1214  0.1203 
Education  -0.3256  0.0973 -0.2784**  0.1127 -0.3665* 0.0979  -0.2830**  0.1137 
Health  -0.3360  0.1586 -0.3532*  0.1162 -0.3235** 0.1437  -0.3581*  0.1171 
Culture   -0.0446 0.1007  -0.1297  0.1274  -0.0830 0.0983  -0.1362  0.1282 
Hired HH  -0.3330  0.0883   0.7504*  0.1724 -0.4491* 0.0894    0.7453*  0.1725 
International    1.1729  0.3305   0.8208  0.6973   1.1803* 0.3485    0.8108  0.6996 
D19   0.1655  0.0506   0.0964***  0.0527   0.1760* 0.0556    0.1025***  0.0530 
D23   0.3300  0.0522   0.2823*  0.0500   0.3665* 0.0566    0.2833*  0.0501 
D27   0.3454  0.0501   0.2983*  0.0491   0.3780* 0.0534    0.3002*  0.0497 
D32   0.6031  0.0478   0.5349*  0.0498   0.6498* 0.0526    0.5367*  0.0502 
Constant    3.4122  0.1211   3.0895*  0.1603   5.4320* 0.2908    3.3680*  0.5534 
N  3109   2685        
R
2 0.2701   0.3095        
F  99.22   35.80        
Lambda       -0.7112*   -0.0749  





Taking into account individual characteristics, the uncorrected results suggest that 
salaried women in Georgia earned only 55.44% of men’s earnings during 2000–2004. 
The corresponding difference coefficient in the decomposition is .59, which is extremely   22
high relative to other countries (Johnes and Tanaka 2008
8; Anderson and Pomfret 2003; 
ADB 2005). 
As it was previously discussed, correcting for the Heckman selection raises the 
gender wage gap. We report the decomposition results with the Heckman correction for 
men and not for women, given that we didn’t find the evidence bias due to sample 
selection bias among women. 
The difference coefficient increases to 1.37 and the means adjust so that women 
earn, on average, only 25.33% of what men do. This implies that without the downward 
pressure on wages (either because more qualified men also have higher wage demands or 
because of the downward pressure on men’s wages), the gender wage inequality would in 
fact have been wider than it appears to be.  
Only 12.69% of the difference is explained by predictors. Most of the difference 
remains unexplained, a result consistent with the literature.  
 
Table 7. Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
  Uncorrected Corrected 




Men 4.37  4.10  4.66  5.15 5.05  4.46 3.78  5.43 
Women 3.78  3.53  4.08  3.78 3.53  4.08 3.50  3.96 
Difference 0.59  0.56  0.57  1.37 1.52  0.38 0.28  1.48 
               
Explained 0.17  0.20  0.12  0.17 0.20  0.12 0.05  -0.06 
Education       -0.02  -0.02  -0.04  0.03 0.00 
Experience       0.00 0.00  0.00 0.06  -0.01 
Experience 
2       -0.01 -0.01  0.00  -0.05  0.00 
Urban       0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.02 
Region       0.01  0.03  -0.01  0.03  -0.02 
Industry      0.21  0.20  0.17  -  - 
Time      0.00  -  -  -0.01  0.02 
Unexplained 0.42  0.37  0.45 1.20 1.32  0.26 0.23  1.53 
               
 
It is noteworthy that given their education, women should in fact be earning more 
than men, although the contribution of education to the gender wage gap is minimal. The 
explained portion of the gap is almost completely attributed to industrial wage 
differentials. This result indicates that personal characteristics seem to matter very little 
in explaining gender wage differentials. The industry of work, however, is the key factor. 
                                                 
8 Johnes and Tanaka’s specification does not include industrial dummies (this analysis does). Including 
them would reduce the size of their estimate of the gender wage gap.   23
To gain additional insight as to within-industry wage differentials, we separate the 
sample into two groups—male-dominated and female-dominated industries—and 
decompose the gender wage gap for each category. We define industries in which more 
than 75% of hired workers are women as female-dominated and industries in which more 
than 75% of hired workers are men as male-dominated. 
Education, health, and domestic household help are the three female-dominated 
industries. In these industries, as expected, the gender wage gap is much smaller, at 0.28. 
Out of it, 16.64% is explained. These also happen to be industries with low mean wages 
(see table 2). 
Six industries can be considered male-dominated: agriculture, mining, energy, 
construction, transport, and public administration. In these industries, the gender wage 
gap is substantial, at 1.47. Out of it, less than 0% is explained, meaning that based on the 
included characteristics, women should be earning more than men, but they are not. 
In interpreting the results of industry-based decompositions, we have to be 
mindful of endogeneity. In our interpretation, the dominance of women in an industry 
leads to less discrimination. However, one of the reasons for women not entering a 
particular industry might be that they expect more discrimination in it in the first place. 
 
Time Trends 
Without the Heckman correction, in 2000 women earned 56.86% of what men did, 
whereas in 2004 they earned 56.36% of what men did. Thus, without sample selection 
correction, it seems that there were not changes. 
The results corrected for sample selection bias however indicate a sizable drop in 
the estimated gender wage gap from 1.52 in 2000 to 0.38 in 2004, still high, but a much 
more “reasonable” number. These correspond to women earning 21.96% of what men 
earned in 2000 and 68.57% of what men earned in 2004. The drop occurs because men’s 
estimated earnings decreased during this period, whereas women’s estimated earnings 
increased (the same as uncorrected results), both factors contributing to the decrease in 
the estimated gender wage gap.   24
The decrease in men’s wages occurs because ρ turns positive in 2004 and, thus, 
the corrected mean wages are lower than the uncorrected mean wages for that year, 
indicating the “regular” reservation wage story.
9 
In 2000 only 13.04% of this difference was explained by predictors, whereas in 
2004 a much higher 32.24% was explained by predictors. 
For both 2000 and 2004, based on education alone, women should be earning 
more than men. However, the most important category explaining the gender wage gap is 
industrial dummy variables. That is, without industrial dummies we would be able to 
explain almost none of the gender wage gap. 
 
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition: Caveats and Further Analysis 
In interpeting the results of this analysis and in comparing them to other studies, we must 
be wary of several factors. In particular, the omission of potentially important variables 
could be one factor responsible for the large degree of gender wage gap found in this 
study. For example, the position in the company is one variable that can influence the 
size of the estimated gender wage gap. In principle, the size of the estimated wage gap is 
likely to decrease if more men hold supervisory positions (which also pay more) relative 
to women. It must be kept in mind that including position as a variable is subject to the 
same objections as using industrial dummies, as both variables capture aspects of 
discrimination. Evidence from Georgia indicates that vertical segregation by gender is, in 
fact, a common occurrence (Sumbadze 2008: 69). 
Another potentially important variable is the size of the company. For example, 
larger companies are presumably more visible. As a result, gender wage differentials in 
these companies might be lower than they are in smaller companies. In addition, the 
ownership of the company can play an important role, as private firms might have more 
leeway at setting their wages and, thus, discrimination might be more prevalent. The 
findings of Jurajda (2003) support this assertion.  
To complement the findings of our analysis with respect to the position within 
firms, firm size, and firm ownership in Georgia, we use the results of the sociological 
survey conducted in Georgia in 2006 and 2007 under the UN project “Gender and 
                                                 
9 First-stage probit results for different years are available upon request.   25
Politics in South Caucasus.” The firms were asked to provide gender statistics, although 
no questions were asked about salaries. The sample consists of 211 private firms and 11 
ministries. The firms are members of the Georgian Business Federation and the Chamber 
of Commerce and thus comprise a highly selective group. Although the results based on 
the survey are likely to underestimate the true extent of gender inequality, they can 
provide helpful insights about the representation of women at the supervisory level and 
the relationship between gender inequality, firm size, and firm ownership in Georgia. 
In the private sector in 2006, 38% of employees were female, however only 
22.3% of the supervising positions were held by females. In 2007 the percentage of 
female employees increased to 42% and the percentage of females in supervisory 
positions jumped to 38.2%. Although these numbers do confirm that women are 
underrepresented at the supervisory level, they compare favorably to other countries 
(Jurajda 2003).
10 The survey results indicate no differences in the proportion of women 
represented in large firms relative to small firms. Neither does it indicate any differences 
in the proportion of women between public and private firms. 
Another key variable, which we haven’t included due to data limitations, is the 
length of time worked, measured either as a dummy for part-time versus full-time work 
or as a continuous variable representing the number of hours worked.
11 According to 
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005), 99% of studies analyzing the gender wage 
gap omit the number of hours and 51% of studies omit the part-time dummy. Brainerd 
(2000) addresses the implications of not having information on the number of hours 
worked. She acknowledges that if women work fewer hours than men do, which is often 
the case, then the gender wage gap will be overestimated. However, without additional 
information the direction of the bias is hard to predict. With respect to part-time work, 
Malysheva and Verashchagina (2007) find that in most former Soviet countries the share 
of part-time employment is minor, possibly indicating that omitting this variable is not 
problematic.  
An important avenue for future work includes the investigation of differences that 
are likely to exist among different income groups, as the present study focused on the 
                                                 
10 Although, again, we have to be mindful of the selective nature of the survey. 
11 When using hourly wages as the dependent variable, the need to include the hours of work does not arise.   26
mean wage differentials. Not only the magnitude, but the nature, of discrimination may 
differ, as could be seen by looking at industrial breakdown (see Jurajda [2003] for more 
on this). 
Finally, future work needs to pay attention to the issue of self-employment. The 
selection process occurs not only with respect to wage employment, but with respect to 
self-employment, in particular for women. A growing number of studies argue for the 
presence of significant differences in the nature and magnitude of the gender wage gap 




The results of this study indicate the presence of a substantial gender wage gap in 
Georgia, most of which cannot be explained by included characteristics. The component 
of the wage gap that can be explained is almost completely due to occupational 
differences, with the majority of the paid female labor force working in three industries: 
education, health care, and culture. These also happen to be industries with the lowest 
mean wages. 
Yet, there are indications of positive changes, as the sample-selection-corrected 
gender wage gap shrank between 2000 and 2004. During this period, industry premia for 
women in high-skilled sectors, such as finance and international organizations, as well as 
manufacturing and energy, increased substantially. Moreover, for women shifts occurred 
within service industry away from health into education and public administration. For 
men, the changes in industry premia and industrial shifts were not as pronounced. 
The results of this study reflect important differences in the way in which women 
have adjusted to the transition process compared to men. In some ways, the difficult 
economic environment coupled with women’s caretaking responsibilities have shielded 
them from experiencing more significant discrimination in the labor market. Due to 
relatively few economic opportunities, men are facing stiff competition for jobs and seem 
to be accepting job opportunities with wages that women might refuse, given their higher 
opportunity cost of time. As a result, men’s wages are depressed and, thus, the gender   27
wage gap does not appear to be as high as it would be if we took into account the 
individuals that are not observed in the sample. 
The results of this study reflect important differences in the way in which women 
have been affected by the transition process compared to men. It appears that women are 
less likely to accept jobs with wages in the lower spectrum of their wage-offer 
distribution, presumably due to their primary caretaking responsibilities. On the other 
hand, among men, stiff competition for jobs, coupled with their primary responsibility as 
financial providers, seem to have led to more men accepting jobs at wages in the lower 
spectrum of their wage-offer distribution. As a result, especially among the less educated, 
a large percentage of men are likely to remain unobserved in the sample. This leads to the 
significant sample selection bias among men, which, when corrected for, raises men’s 
mean wages and decreases the estimates of the education coefficient. Thus, in ironic way, 
a difficult economic environment, together with women’s caretaking responsibilities, 
have shielded women from experiencing more significant discrimination in the labor 
market.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Description of the Variables 
Variable Description 
Gender  0 – male; 1 – female 
Marriage  0 – not married, divorced, or widowed; 1 – registered marriage, non-registered 
marriage, or separated (married)  
Regional 
Dummies  1 if region  = the region of interest, 0 otherwise 




1 – agriculture, forestry, fishing 
2 – mining and quarrying 
3 – manufacturing 
4 – power, gas, and water supply 
5 – construction 
6 – trade and repair of domestic appliances 
7 – hotels and restaurants 
8 – transport, storage, and communications 
9 – financial intermediation 
10 – transactions with real estate, leasing, and R&D 
11 – public administration 
12 – education 
13 – health care and social services 
14 – other services, culture, entertainment, and recreation 
15 – hired services in households 






Table A2. Female Paid Labor Force Composition by Industry 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Agriculture  1.17 0.97 1.28 2.44 1.52 
Mining  0.00 0.48 0.37 0.15 0.00 
Manufacturing  6.44 7.25 5.69 8.09 7.12 
Power  1.02 1.77 2.39 2.90 0.76 
Construction  0.15 0.48 0.55 0.31 0.30 
Trade  11.42 9.18 9.91 8.70 9.70 
Hotels  1.46 2.74 3.67 2.29 3.18 
Transport  4.25 3.70 4.40 3.82 4.39 
Finance  2.78 2.74 1.83 1.68 2.27 
Realestate  3.07 2.58 2.57 3.51 4.09 
Publicadmin  6.59 12.40 10.09  8.70  9.85 
Educations  33.67 33.33 35.60 35.42 36.67 
HealthS  21.38 16.59 15.78 14.05 13.03 
Culture  5.86 5.64 5.32 6.72 5.61 
HiredHH  0.44 0.00 0.55 0.92 0.91 
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Table A3. Male Labor Force Composition by Industry 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Agriculture  3.64 4.18 4.59 8.64 8.82 
Mining  1.04 0.28 1.15 0.81 1.12 
Manufacturing  15.21 14.92 15.41 13.09 13.31 
Power  6.76 6.28 7.05 6.21 5.60 
Construction  6.11 4.60 5.74 6.88 7.28 
Trade  10.66  9.34 10.16 12.55 10.64 
Hotels  1.95 2.37 1.31 0.27 1.45 
Transport  12.61 13.53 12.79 10.53  9.52 
Finance  1.69 1.12 0.82 1.35 1.40 
Realestate  4.29 2.23 2.13 4.72 4.20 
Publicadmin  19.12 24.41 22.95 21.73 20.31 
Educations  7.54 9.34 6.89 6.21 7.28 
HealthS  4.03 2.93 3.77 2.16 2.66 
Culture  5.07 4.46 5.08 4.45 5.46 
HiredHH  0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
International  0.00 0.00 0.16 0.40 0.84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 